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Abstract 
 We investigate the impact of Brexit (the UK’s planned withdrawal from the 
European Union) using computable general equilibrium models featuring conventional 
constant returns-to-scale (CRS) and increasing returns-to-scale (IRS) technology and firm 
heterogeneity, à la Melitz. We show that the imposition of the tariff and nontariff barriers 
associated with Brexit triggers the significant contraction of bilateral trade between the UK 
and the remaining 27 members of the European Union (EU27), exacerbated by firm exit from 
export markets. Given the imposition of these trade barriers, budget savings, migrants 
returning to the EU27 from the UK, and intra-EU27 integration and free trade agreements 
with the US and Japan, the IRS model predicts a total export loss of 5.1–5.8% of UK GDP 
and a total welfare loss of 1.1–1.5%. This is 60% greater than the CRS model predictions. 
However, the impact on output would vary between industries, whereby the UK chemical 
and automobile industries would contract, but its food, business services, and information 
and communication technology industries would expand. In contrast, the EU27 would gain 
substantially from other integration programs, but lose very little from the stronger UK–
EU27 border barriers. This suggests that the EU27 should have little interest in negotiations 
aimed at avoiding a “hard Brexit” (the surrendering by the UK of full access to the single 
market) and that it would be more productive for it to focus on integration programs with 
trade partners other than the UK. 
Keywords 
Brexit; Computable General Equilibrium Analysis; Firm Heterogeneity; Nontariff Barriers; 
Immigration 
JEL Classification: F13, F17, C63, J61
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1. Introduction 
 The internal market of the European Union (EU) has grown continuously by 
progressively accepting new member countries, with Croatia in 2013 being the 28th country 
to join. On June 23, 2016, the results of the referendum for the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom (UK) from the EU known as Brexit shook the EU, which has managed to maintain 
regional cohesion, even following the recent European sovereign debt crisis. Nonetheless, 
Brexit creates many uncertainties regarding the future of Europe. These include the short- 
and long-run impacts of new tariff and nontariff barriers (NTBs) between the UK and the 
remaining 27 members of the EU (EU27), the effect on the common agricultural policy (CAP), 
changes in regulatory policy and standards, and the influence on foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The UK contributions to the EU budget are also significant and require consideration 
(HM Treasury 2013; Núñez Ferrer and Rinaldi 2016). 
 Immediately before the referendum, many economic studies quantitatively assessed 
the impact of Brexit employing structural general equilibrium models, especially computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models and new quantitative trade models (NQTMs) to predict 
its possible consequences. For the most part, these analyses attempted to analyze the impact 
of Brexit using a theoretical framework because suitable empirical data was not available 
given Brexit has not yet taken place. Accordingly, given the wide range of future event 
scenarios, even when similar frameworks are used, the estimates of the macroeconomic 
effects on the UK differ. Overall, most studies estimate a moderate decline, “…in the low 
single-digit percentage range” in terms of UK GDP, as surveyed by Busch and Matthes (2016). 
For example, using a GTAP-based world trade dynamic CGE model, Booth et al. (2015) 
estimated a worst-case reduction in UK GDP of 2.2% by 2030, combining the losses associated 
with tariff imposition (0.9%), border costs (1.2%), and NTBs on goods (0.5%) and services 
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(0.1%), but a saving to its EU budget contribution of 0.5%.1 
Elsewhere, Boulanger and Philippidis (2015) used a world trade CGE model 
calibrated to the GTAP Database and estimated an income effect for 2020. They found that 
a 2% trade cost rise would almost cancel out the benefit of the EU budget saving and that a 
5% rise would lead to a 0.7% loss in terms of UK GDP.2 PwC (2016), using a single-country 
dynamic CGE model, estimated a total loss of 1.2–5.5% of UK GDP, through anticipated 
losses via trade-related barriers (0.5–2.1%), short-run uncertainty in capital markets (0.9–
2.6%), and migration (0.8–1.6%). Lastly, using an NQTM, Dhingra et al. (2017) estimated a 
total welfare loss of 1.3–2.7%, attributed to the loss from the UK’s most favored nation (MFN) 
tariff imposition (0.1%), the UK–EU27 NTBs (0.5–1.3%), and intra-EU27 integration (0.9–
1.6%). OECD (2016) predicted similar losses to UK GDP. 
 Unfortunately, most of these studies focused on just a few aggregate outcome 
variables such as the changes in GDP or net household expenditure, i.e., Hicksian equivalent 
variations (EVs), and thus did not analyze the possible sectoral output and trade changes in 
detail, even though their multisector models were well capable of such analysis. This was 
likely for convenience and the simplicity of presentation for Brexit voters. Moreover, few of 
the CGE studies, unlike the NQTMs, considered the heterogeneity of firms and increasing 
returns-to-scale with a love of variety à la Melitz (2003), recently recognized as a key driver 
of the explosion of trade in the globalized world economy.3 For instance, Brexit should restore 
                                                     
1 CGE studies prior to the Brexit referendum used the GTAP Database Version 8 with a reference year 
of 2007, which is one version older than the current Version 9. 
2 In their main scenario, they assumed a free trade agreement and thus no tariffs between the UK and 
the EU27 following Brexit. 
3 Jafari and Britz (2017) employed a Melitz-type CGE model, but did not compare its results with those 
of a conventional constant returns-to-scale (CRS) CGE model. PwC (2016) incorporated imperfect 
competition with product differentiation between heterogeneous firms, à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), in 
a single-country dynamic CGE model. 
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trade barriers and reduce trade between the UK and the EU27, thereby deteriorating 
national welfare, and possibly accentuated by UK firm exit from EU27 export markets. Firm 
exit would then lower firm productivity and harm consumers through the loss of varieties 
supplied by the trade partners in the internal market. 
 In this paper, we develop two world trade CGE models. One is a standard constant-
returns-to-scale (CRS) model. The other is an increasing-returns-to-scale (IRS) model, 
featuring the Melitz (2003) structure with firm heterogeneity. We conduct Brexit 
experiments using both these models, thereby capturing the effect of firm exit and the loss of 
variety induced by the restoration of trade barriers between the UK and the EU27. In 
particular, we examine: (1) the impact of new trade barriers between the UK and the EU27, 
(2) the effect of EU budget savings and the reduction in labor supply with the return of EU27 
migrants, and (3) the influence of additional economic integration programs by the EU27 
within the internal market and with the US and Japan. Using our numerical simulations 
with the IRS model, we predict a significant export loss of 5.1–5.8% of UK GDP and a total 
welfare loss of 1–1.5%, which is 60% larger than the welfare prediction of the CRS model. 
The impact of output should vary across industries. For example, while new trade barriers 
would protect the food industry in the UK, many other industries would contract, especially 
chemicals and automobiles. Likewise, the UK service sector would gain from a side effect of 
the trade barriers, but be harmed by the return of EU27 immigrant workers. In contrast, the 
EU27 would gain substantially from its other integration programs, but lose very little from 
the rise in the UK–EU27 border barriers. 
 The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our CGE models 
with/without IRS technology and firm heterogeneity. Section 3 presents our Brexit 
simulation scenarios and their backgrounds. The simulation results are in Section 4, focusing 
on sectoral exports and value-added changes with household welfare impacts. Section 5 
provides some concluding comments, followed by some qualifications, which suggest future 
research using a CGE model. The Appendix presents the sensitivity analysis of the 
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simulation results in Section 4 along with details of the assumptions not presented in the 
main text. 
 
2. World Trade CGE Model with Melitz Structure 
 Our world trade CGE models are static models with 12 regions, 21 sectors, and three 
primary factors (skilled and unskilled labor, and capital) (Tables 2.1–2.2). We assume the 
primary factors flexibly reallocate across sectors and equalize factor prices within each region. 
We develop two CGE model variants: 
(1) Armington CGE model with CRS technology 
(2) Melitz CGE model with IRS technology 
 In the IRS CGE model, we assume that seven manufacturing sectors are equipped 
with features, à la Melitz (2003) (Table 2.2) (hereafter the Melitz structure). Based on the 
CRS CGE model, which is a standard model used in many CGE analyses (Hosoe et al. 2010), 
we incorporate firm heterogeneity, product differentiation, and monopolistic competition 
following Dixon et al. (2016). Starting from the bottom of Figure 2.1, which describes the core 
part of the model structure, we assume that the domestic output of the i-th sector in the r-th 
region riZ ,  is produced using primary factors, intermediate input, and a fixed setup cost 
MLZ
riH , . Of riZ , , srikZZ ,,,  is used to produce the k-th variety shipped to the s-th region 
(including that shipped to domestic region r) srikQT ,,,  with a fixed variety production cost 
MLZ
sriF ,, . The variety srikQT ,,,  is aggregated into a variety composite good sriQT ,,  in the lower 
variety nest with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function and the elasticity of 
substitution 
MLZ
i , à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
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Table 2.1: Regional Aggregation 
Regions Abbreviation 
UK GBR 
EU 27 EU27 
Benelux BNL 
France FRA 
Germany DEU 
Italy ITA 
Poland POL 
Spain ESP 
Sweden SWE 
Other EU OEU 
Japan JPN 
US USA 
Rest of the World (ROW) ROW 
 
Table 2.2: Sectors, Elasticity of Substitution 
ARM
i , and UK Tariff Rate 
Sectors (abbreviation) Elasticity of 
substitution 
ARM
i b 
UK tariff rates applied 
to non-EU members 
(%)c 
Agriculture (AGR) 2.39 2.6 
Mining (MIN) 5.31 0.0 
Textiles and Apparel (TXA) 3.78 7.2 
Food and Beverages (FOD) 2.49 11.9 
Wood, Paper, and Printing (WPP) 3.09 0.5 
Chemical (CHM)a 2.66 1.4 
Steel and Metal (STL)a 2.66 1.0 
Automotive (AUT)a 2.66 4.3 
Other Transportation Equipment (OTE) a 2.66 1.2 
Electric Equipment (EEQ) a 2.66 1.1 
Machinery (MCH) a 2.66 1.4 
Other Manufacturing (MAN)a 2.66 1.0 
Air Transportation (ATR) 1.90 – 
Water Transportation (WTR) 1.90 – 
Other Transportation (OTR) 1.90 – 
Business and ICT Service (ICT) 1.90 – 
Finance and Insurance (FIN) 1.90 – 
Communication (CMM) 1.90 – 
Construction (CON) 1.90 – 
Personal, Cultural, and Other Services (PCS) 1.90 – 
Services (SRV) 1.98 – 
a: IRS sectors equipped with the Melitz structure in the IRS CGE model. 
b: The elasticity of 2.66 for the IRS sectors is assumed to be 70% of the lower “variety nest” 
elasticity 
MLZ
i  (= 3.8). For the remaining sectors, the elasticity is from the GTAP 
Database Version 9A. 
c: From the GTAP Database Version 9A. MFN tariff rates by the EU27 are similar to those 
of the UK, as reported in the Appendix. 
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Figure 2.1: Core Structure of IRS CGE Model 
 
Note: This figure depicts the commodity flows of the i-th sector in the r-th region, as 
illustrated for a single-country model by Hosoe et al. (2010). The production process of the 
domestic output riZ ,  omitted for simplicity. Trade partners are denoted r, s, and s’; variety 
producers denoted k and k’. The dot   represents the “average productivity firm.” 
 
 The fixed costs 
MLZ
riH , and 
MLZ
sriF ,,  are measured in terms of domestic output riZ ,  
units, following Itakura and Oyamada (2015). Incidentally, while Melitz (2003) originally 
measured these fixed costs in terms of labor units, there have been alternative approaches 
in its CGE implementation. For example, Zhai (2008) assumed a combination of capital, labor, 
and intermediates for the fixed inputs, while Balistreri and Rutherford (2013) used a 
composite factor (i.e., a mix of capital and labor). A draw from a Pareto distribution 
determines a firm’s productivity. In this setup, while all the operating firms ship their output 
to the domestic market, only very productive firms that can afford the fixed cost of export.4 
 The Armington (1969) composite good riQ ,  is produced using the variety composite 
                                                     
4 The model equation list is in the Annex, available upon request. 
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rsiQT ,,  supplied from all regions according to a CES aggregation function with an elasticity 
of substitution of 
ARM
i . When we use the same elasticity value for 
ARM
i  and 
MLZ
i , the 
two-stage nested CES functions reduce to a single stage, as originally employed by Melitz 
(2003). Departing from Melitz’s original model, we distinguish between these elasticities so 
that we can separately examine the effect of the heterogeneity among goods across source 
regions (the Armington structure) and the effect of firm heterogeneity and product 
differentiation (the Melitz structure) on productivity in the seven IRS sectors. The former 
mainly describes the trade reaction; the latter the intensity of the scale economies and 
monopolistic power. While maintaining country tastes, this extension can facilitate 
consideration of different markups (or competition intensity) between markets (De Loecker 
et al. (2016)). 
 The two-nest modeling approach provides another benefit. When we assume a 
smaller value for 
ARM
i  in the upper nest than that for 
MLZ
i  in the lower nest, equilibrium 
computation becomes quite smooth and robust, whereas existing studies using Melitz-type 
CGE models often face a computational difficulty because of its extreme nonconvexity. For 
example, Balistreri and Rutherford (2013) developed an algorithm that iteratively solves a 
CRS CGE model with exogenous productivity and a Melitz-type partial equilibrium model to 
estimate productivity changes induced by trade volume changes estimated by the CRS CGE 
model. Akgul et al. (2010) linearized the model system. Other studies compromised with a 
simpler CGE model featuring a small number of IRS sectors and/or a smaller number of 
sectors and regions to manage the computational problem. 
 The CRS CGE model (as well as the CRS sectors in the IRS CGE model) is not 
equipped with this Melitz structure. The domestic output riZ ,  serves directly in the 
production of sriQT ,, without any variety or fixed costs. Many CGE models are equipped with 
a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function to determine the allocation between 
exports and domestic supply (i.e., imperfect transformation). However, like other Melitz-type 
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CGE models, our IRS and CRS models do not include any CET function (or equivalently, they 
assume the perfect transformation between exports and domestic supply) in order to make 
the model structures of our CRS and IRS models similar and to highlight the role of the 
Melitz structure. 
 The Armington composite good riQ ,  is used by domestic agents, comprising 
households 
p
riX , , governments 
g
riX , , investment 
v
riX , , and intermediates rjiX ,, . The 
utility of a representative household depends on household consumption and a Cobb–
Douglas-type utility function. We assume governments keep their consumption level 
g
iX  
constant, irrespective of revenues from indirect taxes and import tariffs, with fiscal gaps 
filled by a lump-sum direct tax on households. This approach results in any EU budget 
savings as being eventual transfers from EU27 to UK households, not between their 
respective governments. Therefore, we do not need any assumption about government 
expenses concerning the budget savings. 
 Investment use 
v
iX  is also constant. We include two foreign exchange regimes in 
the model: a pegged exchange rate system between the Eurocurrency regions (Benelux, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the other EU) and a floating system for all others.5 We 
allow foreign savings to change endogenously among the former and fix foreign savings in 
the ROW’s currency term for the latter.6 Lump-sum household savings fill any investment–
savings gaps to ensure constant investment. 
 We calibrate the model to the GTAP Database Version 9A, which has a reference 
                                                     
5 For simplicity, we assume the non-Euro countries in the ‘Other EU’ region (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, 
Denmark, Hungary, and Romania) are in the Euro region. 
6 As foreign savings are equivalent to transfers in this static model context (Hosoe et al. 2010, Ch. 7), 
reporting outcomes for the individual regions in the Eurocurrency countries could be very misleading. 
Therefore, we only report the aggregate results for the entire EU27, not for its individual regions. 
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year of 2011 (Hertel 1997). For the parameters that characterize the Melitz structure, we use 
the estimate of 3.8 by Bernard et al. (2003) for 
MLZ
i  and the estimate of 4.6 by Balistreri et 
al. (2011) for the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution 
MLZ
i , which determines the 
degree of firm heterogeneity. As comparable parameter estimates are uncommon, we apply 
the same parameter values for all seven IRS sectors in all regions, following standard practice 
in CGE analysis, such as Dixon et al. (2016) and Balistreri and Rutherford (2013). The 
elasticity of substitution 
ARM
i  in the Armington (1969) nest is from the GTAP Database for 
the 14 sectors, assumed CRS sectors in the IRS model (Table 2.2). We assume 2.66 for 
ARM
i  
in the other seven sectors, assumed IRS sectors in the IRS model. This assumption is based 
on a 30% smaller value of the lower nest elasticity of substitution between varieties 
MLZ
i .7 
 
3. Simulation Scenarios 
 While Brexit should result in a variety of changes in European economic and 
political systems, we focus on the essential factors likely realized in the near future that 
would affect UK–EU27 trade. This trade is particularly important for the UK because the 
EU27 represents about half of UK exports, but the UK only 10% of EU27 exports. We consider 
the following seven scenario factors, which comprise the total Brexit shock (ALL) (Table 3.1). 
Details are below. 
 
                                                     
7  To check the robustness of our simulation results with respect to this assumption, we conduct 
sensitivity analysis as shown in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.1: Main Simulation Scenarios 
Scenarios Abbreviation 
Brexit with all the scenario factors ALL 
of which  
Direct/Short-run Impact  
(1) EU Budget Savings BUD 
(2) UK–EU MFN Tariff Imposition TRF 
(3) UK–EU NTB Risea NTB–UK 
(4) Returning Migrants from the UK MIG 
Indirect/Long-run Impact  
(5) Deeper EU27 Integration through NTB Reductiona NTB–EU 
(6) FTA with Japana FTA–JP 
(7) FTA with the USa FTA–US 
a: Scenarios that have lower and upper sub-scenarios about the magnitude of the NTB 
changes. 
 
3.1 EU Budget Contribution Saving (BUD) 
 By leaving the EU, the UK no longer has to contribute to the EU budget. In 2011–
2013, this amounted to 0.5% of UK GDP (HM Treasury 2013). We follow Dhingra et al. (2017) 
and use their conservative estimate, as great as 0.3% of UK GDP, for the expected savings. 
Similarly, Núñez Ferrer and Rinaldi (2016) estimated that the budget savings would be about 
0.4% of UK GDP for 2014. We model these savings as transfers from the EU27 regions back 
to the UK, with the cost of transfers (in GBP), borne and allocated among the eight EU27 
regions in proportion to their present GDP. As Núñez Ferrer and Rinaldi (2016) suggested 
that the gross budget contribution changes involved with Brexit among the EU27 would not 
be sizable, our assumption concerning the allocation of the additional budget burden among 
the EU27 regions is not critical. In turn, UK households directly capture these budget saving 
benefits. As explained in Section 2, the UK government does not use the budget savings for 
its own operations or any other programs (e.g., National Health Service) in our simulation 
experiments. 
 
3.2 Tariff Imposition between the UK and the EU27 (TRF) 
 Both regions are assumed to impose import tariffs as high as those that they 
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presently apply to non-EU members. Many Brexit studies refer to this as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) option, which follows the MFN principle. Table 2.2 shows that as often 
observed in many developed countries, MFN tariff rates are very low. TXA and FOD are 
exceptions as major goods in household consumption. Therefore, we expect the MFN tariff 
imposition between the UK and the EU27 to affect household welfare substantially. 
Alternatively, we could assume that following (successful) Brexit negotiations, the UK and 
the EU27 would reach a free trade agreement (FTA), similar to that the EU already has with 
Norway and Switzerland. Although we consider only the WTO option in our experiments, we 
could easily infer the outcome of the FTA option from a breakdown of the simulation results 
in Section 4. 
 
3.3 NTB Rise between UK and EU27 (NTB–UK) 
 NTBs will increase with Brexit, but the result is difficult to observe directly. As 
there is no direct estimate of the (ad valorem tariff-equivalent rate) NTBs newly set between 
the UK and the EU27, we use Ecorys’ (2009) estimate of existing NTBs by the EU for the US 
(Table 3.2). 8  Ecorys (2009) argues that only part of the NTBs would be ‘actionable’ or 
reducible even in a full-liberalization case because some of the barriers–for example, 
language barriers, and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations–could not be removed. The 
actionable NTBs are broken into two components: cost creating and rent creating.9 Following 
the conservative assumption by Dhingra et al. (2017), we assume that only a quarter of the 
EU NTB estimates currently set against US exports will be newly set between the UK and 
                                                     
8 Egger et al. (2016) provides alternative estimates of intra-EU NTBs on goods larger than Ecorys’ 
(2009) estimates we employ. 
9 The median of Ecorys’ (2009) estimates that are summarized in the Appendix indicate that the 
actionable part comprises about a half of the total NTB and that the cost-creating NTB accounts for 
about 60% of the actionable NTBs. 
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the EU27. Given the significant uncertainty regarding the new UK–EU27 NTBs, we prepare 
two sub-scenarios for the NTB changes following Ecorys (2009). The lower NTB sub-scenario 
employs the NTB estimates based only on the cost-creating part; the upper NTB sub-scenario 
uses a more aggressive assumption with the NTB estimates of the whole actionable part (i.e., 
both cost and rent creating) (Table 3.3). We incorporate NTBs as iceberg-type transportation 
costs in our model. We present and discuss the simulation results given the lower NTB sub-
scenario in the main text and the results with the upper NTB sub-scenario in the Appendix. 
 
Table 3.2: Assumed Bilateral Ad Valorem Tariff Equivalent NTBs [%] 
 
Sources: Ecorys (2009) for the US–EU, Copenhagen Economics (2010) for Japan, Aussilloux 
et al. (2011) for intra-EU, and author’s own assumptions. 
Note: NTBs between the UK and the EU27 are presently zero but increase in the NTB–UK 
scenario. 
 
From: EU EU EU EU EU EU EU EU EU27/GBR EU EU JPN USA
To: BNL OEU FRA DEU ITA POL ESP SWE GBR/EU27 JPN USA EU EU
AGR 27.6 31.0 30.3 33.7 34.0 33.5 32.4 32.0 32.2
TXA 39.9 45.7 44.6 44.0 45.0 45.9 46.3 44.7 46.3 16.7 19.2
FOD 48.4 63.6 63.8 63.7 65.0 63.8 64.7 62.4 64.2 25.0 73.3 56.8
WPP 1.9 5.5 3.0 8.4 5.4 5.5 8.3 9.3 14.7 15.4 7.7 11.3
CHM 32.2 44.4 40.5 43.5 42.8 45.6 44.1 42.1 44.8 22.0 21.0 18.0 23.9
STL 1.7 4.3 1.9 5.1 4.6 5.5 4.7 6.3 4.9 21.3 17.0 6.0 11.9
AUT 1.5 2.5 2.2 3.7 3.1 2.0 2.1 3.4 2.4 10.0 26.8 16.3 25.5
OTE 3.3 13.4 2.3 3.6 5.4 2.6 6.5 9.0 2.5 45.0 19.1 18.8 18.8
EEQ 3.9 5.4 5.6 8.8 9.2 4.6 10.5 13.8 8.7 11.6 6.5 4.5 6.5
MCH 4.2 6.1 4.8 9.6 7.5 5.3 7.9 10.3 7.9 30.0
MAN 40.1 55.5 58.2 55.4 57.0 54.9 56.6 50.6 54.0
ATR 13.6 13.3 14.2 17.7 15.6 13.6 11.5 16.4 18.9 2.0 2.0
WTR 37.2 35.2 38.7 38.8 41.7 37.9 34.4 40.6 39.9 8.0 8.0
OTR 13.6 13.3 14.2 17.7 15.6 13.6 11.5 16.4 18.9
ICT 20.7 20.0 19.1 24.9 24.0 21.4 21.8 23.7 20.2 2.5 3.9 14.9 14.9
FIN 25.5 24.7 20.4 25.4 24.8 24.5 24.4 25.5 29.4 15.8 31.7 11.3 11.3
INS 42.4 42.2 38.6 42.8 43.8 42.2 42.6 42.9 44.0 6.5 19.1 10.8 10.8
CMM 20.9 20.9 18.8 23.0 23.5 21.0 21.5 24.8 22.6 24.7 1.7 11.7 11.7
CON 24.9 24.6 20.4 35.3 27.3 27.5 26.0 31.0 27.6 2.5 2.5 4.6 4.6
PCS 25.0 24.8 23.9 28.5 27.2 25.1 23.6 27.3 30.1 6.5 2.5 4.4 4.4
SRV 25.0 24.8 23.9 28.5 27.2 25.1 23.6 27.3 30.1
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Table 3.3: Assumed Change in NTBs in a Lower NTB Sub-scenario [% points] 
 
Sources: Ecorys (2009), Copenhagen Economics (2010), Aussilloux et al. (2011), and author’s 
own assumptions. 
Note: The upper sub-scenario assumptions are in the Appendix. 
 
3.4 Returning Migrants from UK (MIG) 
 Brexit will no longer permit the free movement of workers from outside the UK, 
with more rigorous immigration procedures and regulations applied to foreign labor. As the 
UK currently accepts more immigrants from the EU27 than emigrants to the EU27, the UK 
will lose its (immigrant) labor supply following Brexit. The GMig2 Database, which is a 
satellite database of the GTAP Database (Walmsley et al. 2005), reports that wages 
amounting to 1.2% of UK GDP are currently paid to EU27 nationals in the UK and 0.57% of 
UK GDP (or 0.09% of EU27 GDP) is paid to the UK nationals in the EU27. That is, the UK 
pays net wages to nationals from the EU27 equal to 0.63% of UK GDP (or 0.10% of EU27 
GDP).  
While there is much uncertainty about the new immigration policy, we assume 50% 
of net immigrants will leave the UK, with the returning migrants allocated among the eight 
EU27 regions according to their regional GDP. In our experiments, we model this a shift in 
skilled and unskilled labor endowment from the UK to the EU27. More specifically, we 
assume the UK will lose 0.52% and 0.83% of its total skilled and unskilled labor endowment, 
respectively. In comparison, Kirkegaard (2017) estimated that the growth rate of the UK 
From: EU EU EU EU EU EU EU EU EU27/GBR EU27 EU27 JPN USA
To: BNL OEU FRA DEU ITA POL ESP SWE GBR/EU27 JPN USA EU27 EU27
AGR −8.3 −9.3 −9.1 −10.1 −10.2 −10.1 −9.7 −9.6
TXA −12.0 −13.7 −13.4 −13.2 −13.5 −13.8 −13.9 −13.4 1.6 −6.9 −6.5
FOD −14.5 −19.1 −19.1 −19.1 −19.5 −19.1 −19.4 −18.7 5.2 −6.0 −23.9 −20.8
WPP −0.6 −1.7 −0.9 −2.5 −1.6 −1.7 −2.5 −2.8 1.2 −7.1 −3.6 −4.7
CHM −9.6 −13.3 −12.1 −13.1 −12.8 −13.7 −13.2 −12.6 2.3 −15.0 −8.0 −7.3 −9.2
STL −0.5 −1.3 −0.6 −1.5 −1.4 −1.7 −1.4 −1.9 0.7 −4.3 −5.6 −1.9 −2.7
AUT −0.5 −0.8 −0.7 −1.1 −0.9 −0.6 −0.6 −1.0 2.1 −1.2 −7.3 −3.5 −8.2
OTE −1.0 −4.0 −0.7 −1.1 −1.6 −0.8 −2.0 −2.7 1.6 −33.8 −5.3 −3.1 −6.2
EEQ −1.2 −1.6 −1.7 −2.6 −2.8 −1.4 −3.2 −4.1 0.4 −2.6 −1.6 −1.7 −1.7
MCH −1.3 −1.8 −1.4 −2.9 −2.3 −1.6 −2.4 −3.1 −2.9
MAN −12.0 −16.7 −17.5 −16.6 −17.1 −16.5 −17.0 −15.2
ATR −4.1 −4.0 −4.3 −5.3 −4.7 −4.1 −3.5 −4.9 −0.9 −0.4
WTR −11.2 −10.6 −11.6 −11.6 −12.5 −11.4 −10.3 −12.2 −3.5 −1.4
OTR −4.1 −4.0 −4.3 −5.3 −4.7 −4.1 −3.5 −4.9
ICT −6.2 −6.0 −5.7 −7.5 −7.2 −6.4 −6.5 −7.1 0.7 −2.5 −1.4 −2.5 −2.9
FIN −7.7 −7.4 −6.1 −7.6 −7.4 −7.4 −7.3 −7.7 0.6 −5.8 −9.8 −2.9 −2.3
INS −12.7 −12.7 −11.6 −12.8 −13.1 −12.7 −12.8 −12.9 0.7 −0.8 −5.5 −2.8 −2.8
CMM −6.3 −6.3 −5.6 −6.9 −7.1 −6.3 −6.5 −7.4 1.1 −12.8 −0.5 −4.3 −4.3
CON −7.5 −7.4 −6.1 −10.6 −8.2 −8.3 −7.8 −9.3 0.3 −1.2 −0.8 −1.9 −1.3
PCS −7.5 −7.4 −7.2 −8.6 −8.1 −7.5 −7.1 −8.2 0.2 −2.5 −0.3 −1.0 −0.6
SRV −7.5 −7.4 −7.2 −8.6 −8.1 −7.5 −7.1 −8.2
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labor force of about 0.4% p.a. in 2016 would fall to almost zero if the Conservative Party’s 
immigration policy of limiting the annual flow of new immigrants to 100,000 persons came 
into effect. By contrast, the more aggressive immigration policy assumed by PwC (2016) 
implies that UK employment would fall by 1.7–2.9% in the short run. 
 
3.5 Further Integration of EU27 through NTB Reduction (NTB–EU) 
 Brexit will leave the UK behind further and faster integration within the EU27. 
This will likely divert EU27 export destinations and import sources from the UK to intra-
EU27 and more severely harm the post-Brexit UK economy. As the internal market no longer 
has import tariffs to reduce among its members, only intra-EU27 NTBs will fall. Aussilloux 
et al. (2011) provide the intra-EU NTB estimates, and Egger et al. (2015) also estimated 
intra-EU NTBs, which are generally consistent with those in Aussilloux et al. (2011). As these 
did do not separately report the actionable (or cost-creating) parts, using the median 
estimates in Ecorys (2009) of EU NTBs for US exports, we employ a ballpark assumption 
that 50% of the reported NTBs are actionable and that 60% of the actionable NTBs are 
attributable to cost-creating NTBs. 
 
3.6 FTAs with US and Japan (FTA–US and FTA–JP) 
 The EU has carried out FTA negotiations with major economies outside the internal 
market. One is with the US, known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), whose impact has been assessed by, for example, Ecorys (2009), Egger et al. (2015), 
and Latorre and Yonezawa (2017). Another is an FTA with Japan, as assessed by 
Copenhagen Economics (2010), European Commission (2016), and others. We consider tariff 
abolition between the EU27 and the US or Japan along with their reciprocal NTB reductions. 
We rely on Ecorys (2009) and Copenhagen Economics (2010) for estimates of the ad-valorem 
tariff equivalent NTBs and their actionable and cost-creating components to prepare the 
Impact of Brexit: Firm Exit and Loss of Variety  Page 15 
lower and upper sub-scenarios for NTB reduction, as with the UK–EU27 NTB estimates and 
changes (Tables 3.2–3.3). Our objective is to measure the UK loss in trade and welfare from 
trade diversion by the EU27. 
 
4. Simulation Results 
4.1 Shrinking UK–EU27 Trade 
 Brexit would substantially reduce bilateral exports between the UK and the EU27 
through both higher mutual trade barriers and by trade diversion induced by deeper 
integration within the EU27, and with the US and Japan (Figure 4.1). Manufacturing exports 
would particularly suffer. From the base, TXA and FOD would reduce their UK exports 
around 40% and the EU27 exports around 30%. These reductions are attributable not only 
to their relatively high MFN tariffs (Table 2.2) but also to the NTB rise (Table 3.3). CHM 
would also experience a comparable decline in the UK exports, despite the imposition of a 
small tariff (1.4%) and an NTB rise (2.3%). Being subject to the third-highest MFN tariff 
barrier of 4.3% in the UK plus a tariff-equivalent NTB rise of 2.1%, AUT would suffer a loss 
of around 20% of export. In contrast, facing smaller NTB rises and no tariff rise, UK service 
exports would increase moderately, except for the transportation sector. 
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Figure 4.1: Total Impact of Brexit (ALL) on UK–EU27 Bilateral Exports 
[Change from Base, %] 
 
[Export Value Change, % of UK GDP] 
 
Note: IRS and CRS are the results of the IRS and CRS models, respectively. Results of the 
upper NTB sub-scenario are in the Appendix. 
 
 As the theory of firm heterogeneity suggests (e.g., Arkolakis et al. 2012), the IRS 
CGE model predicts larger impacts. For example, the IRS model predicts a 24% larger AUT 
export loss than the CRS model. This large trade loss, induced by the very moderate tariff 
(4.3%) and NTB (2.1% of an ad valorem tariff equivalent barrier) increases, is exacerbated 
by the decrease in their extensive margins, which the Melitz IRS model can describe with 
firm exit (Figure 4.2). This suggests a drastic contraction of this industry in the UK, which 
is an export platform for automotive products into the internal market (Inagaki 2016). The 
number of UK AUT export varieties to the EU27 would also fall by 20% and the industry 
would become more oriented to the domestic market. 
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Figure 4.2: Impact of Brexit (ALL) on Number of Firms by Supply Destination in the UK (top) 
and EU27 (bottom) 
[% Change from Base] 
 
 
Note: Results with the upper NTB sub-scenario in the Appendix. 
 
 EU27 exports to the UK (or UK imports from the EU27) would also experience a 
fall, mainly in terms of goods. These are sometimes more substantial than the UK export 
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UK, especially in ICT and SRV. However, these goods and services export losses do not imply 
that EU27 total exports (to both the UK and other regions) would suffer more seriously than 
UK total exports (Figure 4.3). EU27 aggregate exports to the UK would fall not only by the 
UK–EU27 trade barriers but also by trade diversion induced by greater integration with 
other regions. In contrast to the sharp fall in UK exports, the EU27 export loss to the UK 
would be only a small fraction of the changes in trade volume. Deeper intra-EU27 integration 
and FTAs with the US and Japan would provide the EU27 with better export opportunities, 
especially in TXA, FOD and CHM along with AUT. Incidentally, CHM and AUT in the UK 
would also lose access to the US market owing to trade diversion under the TTIP, although 
the FTA with Japan would not have any visible trade diversion effect on UK exports. 
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Figure 4.3: Impact of Brexit (ALL) on Exports for the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom) by 
Direction Predicted with an IRS Model 
[Export Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
 
 
Note: Results with the CRS Model and/or with upper NTB sub-scenario in the Appendix. 
 
 The aggregate export volume change confirms the above findings (Figure 4.4). The 
UK would lose exports as great as 5% of its GDP, mostly through the UK–EU27 border tariff 
(TRF) and NTB rise (NTB-UK). The EU budget saving (BUD) becomes the third-largest 
negative factor for the export contraction, at the same time as being an expected pecuniary 
benefit for the UK. This is because the budget saving, being an eventual transfer from the 
EU27 makes the Euro relatively abundant, and thus it depreciates against the GBP, thereby 
reducing UK exports. The EU27 would increase exports through further intra-EU27 
integration (NTB–EU) and by the TTIP (FTA–US). In contrast, TRF and NTB–UK would 
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only marginally reduce EU27 exports, while export losses by the UK and gains by the EU27 
would intensify when we use the IRS model, which tends to predict a larger trade reaction to 
the border barrier changes. 
 
Figure 4.4: Aggregate Export Changes by Scenario Factor with the Lower NTB Sub-scenario 
[Export Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
 
Note: Results with the upper NTB sub-scenario are in the Appendix. 
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(Figure 4.5).10 In addition, this protection is only possible by sacrificing many other sectors, 
especially TXA, CHM, AUT, and SRV. The breakdown of the sectoral value-added changes 
indicates the striking result that TRF and NTB–UK could succeed in protecting only FOD. 
Elsewhere, UK service sectors, such as ICT and SRV, would gain from the UK–EU27 border 
barriers because the primary factors in the contracting manufacturing sectors relocate to 
service sectors less seriously affected by the border barrier rises. 
 
                                                     
10 When we employ the CRS model, MCH would lose their output through Brexit, as shown in the 
Appendix. 
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Figure 4.5: Value-added Change in the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom), Predicted by an IRS 
Model with the Lower NTB Sub-scenario  
[Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
 
 
Note: Simulation results with the CRS model and/or with the upper NTB sub-scenario in the 
Appendix. 
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budget savings (BUD) would increase domestic household consumption, especially in SRV. 
As service sectors comprise about half of total household consumption, its impact on service 
output would be significant in the UK. At the same time, the budget savings would trigger 
an appreciation of the GBP, which would suppress the exports and output of many 
manufacturing sectors and ICT. The impact of MIG and BUD on sectoral output would 
demonstrate a sharp contrast between the UK and the EU27 in two aspects: qualitatively, 
these shocks would affect their sectoral outputs in opposite directions; quantitatively, as the 
EU27 economy is much larger, the output changes in the EU27 would not be as significant 
as for the UK. 
 Economic integration programs outside the UK (NTB–EU, FTA–JP, and FTA–US) 
would affect value-added differently across the UK industries. While TXA, FOD, CHM, and, 
SRV would suffer from these integration programs, STL, MCH, and ICT would gain. In the 
EU27, these three integration programs would improve allocative efficiency by intensifying 
concentration in its most competitive sectors (TXA, FOD, and SRV) by mobilizing primary 
factors from less competitive sectors (STL, MCH, and ICT). In turn, imports from the UK 
should compensate for any reduction in supply by these contracting sectors in the EU27. This 
substitution effect provides the UK with opportunities for exporting these particular goods 
and services. Among the three integration programs, FTA–JP would affect the EU27 only for 
FOD, CHM, and AUT and to a very limited extent, and therefore would propagate little to 
the UK. 
 
4.3 Macroeconomic Consequences 
 Having analyzed the impact of Brexit at the industrial level, we examine its overall 
welfare impacts with Hicksian equivalent variations (EVs) by measuring the net household 
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expenditure changes (Figure 4.6).11 The IRS model suggests that the UK would suffer a 
welfare loss of 1.1% from Brexit (ALL) with the lower NTB sub-scenario. In the upper NTB 
sub-scenario, the welfare loss would be as much as 1.5% of UK GDP.12 NTB–UK, MIG, and 
NTB–EU are the major negative factors for the UK, while BUD is the only positive effect. 
MIG would be the second-largest factor in the welfare impacts, even though it is only a minor 
consideration in the export impact (Figure 4.4). The following three transmission channels 
for MIG explain this somewhat counterintuitive result. One is the weak trade channel, as 
shown in Figure 4.4. The second is a transfer channel, whereby the transfer of labor 
endowment, worth 0.32% of UK GDP in total, to the EU27 directly reduces labor income in 
the UK. The third is that MIG makes the UK domestic labor market tighter and harms the 
competitiveness of its labor-intensive sectors, especially ICT and SRV. These service sectors 
would less likely decrease given the revised UK–EU27 trade barriers.  They are therefore 
the most promising sectors left for the UK. However, MIG undermines the source of their 
competitiveness by reducing the labor endowments (Figure 4.5). Notably, the sum of these 
three negative impacts (TRF, NTB–UK, and MIG) would exceed the expected benefit from 
BUD, even without considering further integration programs by the EU27.13 
 
                                                     
11 As government consumption and investment uses are kept constant with fixed current account 
deficits (or foreign savings), the change in household expenditure is almost identical to the change in 
GDP. 
12 Details are shown in the Appendix. 
13 Even if we alternatively assume that the budget savings would be as large as 0.5% of UK GDP, it is 
obvious that the overall impact of Brexit would still be significantly negative for the UK. 
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Figure 4.6: Welfare Impact of Brexit by Scenario Factors with the Lower NTB Sub-scenario  
[Equivalent Variations, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
 
Note: Detailed results with the lower and upper NTB sub-scenarios are in the Appendix. 
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in combination with BUD, the CRS model consistently predicts an overall welfare loss from 
Brexit (ALL). Comparing the welfare impacts by these two models, the IRS model predicts a 
60% larger impact than the CRS model, although the seven IRS sectors currently account for 
only 11% and 16% of the UK and EU27 GDP, respectively. 
 Three direct negative shocks (BUD, TRF, and NTB–UK) would adversely affect the 
EU27 but would decrease its welfare by only 0.1% of EU27 GDP. This small impact is partly 
because the EU27 is not as dependent on the UK for trade and partly because the EU27 can 
maintain its size (six times larger in GDP and nine times larger in population) so that it can 
continue to enjoy economies of scale and sufficient variety through intra-EU27 trade even 
without the UK. Moreover, it is notable that the benefit of MIG would almost fully cancel out 
the combined losses. The marginal losses from these three direct negative shocks suggest 
that it would be more productive for the EU27 to focus on accelerating intra-EU27 integration 
and/or TTIP negotiation, rather than engaging in negotiations aimed at avoiding a hard 
Brexit. 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Our simulation results depend on the assumed parameters, especially the elasticity 
of substitution. In the IRS model case, our sensitivity analysis shows that a larger 
ARM
i  
and a smaller 
MLZ
i  result in a more severe welfare deterioration for the UK (Figure 4.7). 
On the other hand, the EU27 would suffer under a smaller 
ARM
i , while the effect of 
alternative values for 
MLZ
i  on welfare is not clear. All CGE studies with the Melitz-type 
                                                     
elasticity 
ARM
i , which weakens the terms-of-trade effect. When we assume 60% larger values for 
ARM
i  in all the sectors of the CRS model, the welfare impact of TRF would become negative. 
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IRS feature, to our best knowledge, used the same values for these two elasticities 
ARM
i  
and 
MLZ
i , and collapsed the two-stage CES nests of the Armington composite and the 
variety composite into a one-stage CES nest, following the original specification by Melitz 
(2003).15 These models did not distinguish between the different roles of these elasticities or 
the nested structure, but jointly examined their impact with a single elasticity of substitution. 
Our sensitivity analysis shows that the two elasticities could affect welfare in different 
directions in our empirical setting. The CRS model, without the Melitz structure, allows us 
to examine only the effect of 
ARM
i . We find its effect to be consistent with the results of 
many other CRS CGE analyses in that a larger 
ARM
i  leads to larger welfare changes. The 
welfare impact would be much less sensitive to 
ARM
i  in the CRS model than in the IRS 
model. 
 
                                                     
15 They followed Melitz’s original model with a single-nest CES specification partly for model simplicity 
and partly for examination of the welfare impact equivalence with respect to the “trade elasticities” 
with CGE models, as suggested by Arkolakis et al. (2012). 
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Figure 4.7: Sensitivity of Welfare Impact Estimates on the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom) with 
the Lower NTB Sub-scenario 
[% Point Changes from Welfare Impact in Figure 4.6] 
 
 
Note: Results of the sensitivity test with the upper NTB sub-scenario are in the Appendix 
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Figure 4.6 are not necessarily so marked. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 We conducted a Brexit impact analysis using a state-of-the-art CGE model with 
firm heterogeneity, which evokes productivity changes from firm exit and a loss of variety. 
The scope of our Brexit scenarios is limited to trade-related barriers that disconnect the UK 
from the remaining EU27 members and to future integration programs that leave the UK 
behind. In this sense, we should consider our impact estimates as lower bounds. Even so, the 
UK would significantly lose exports as large as 5.1–5.8% of GDP. It would also suffer a 
significant welfare deterioration, four times larger than the expected pecuniary benefit of the 
EU budget savings. Firm exit from export markets would also exacerbate any losses for the 
UK, as demonstrated by the IRS model with firm heterogeneity. Consequently, the total loss 
could be as much as 1.1% or 1.5% of UK GDP with the lower and upper NTB sub-scenarios, 
respectively. Even based on the conservative assumptions of Brexit shocks, our estimates of 
the welfare loss are consistent with or close to the lower side of the earlier estimates, which 
generally assume more shocks of greater magnitude. 
 UK voters may see these estimated economic losses as acceptable and reasonable 
given the cost of their sovereignty within the EU, and the freedom from regulations and 
bureaucracy enacted in the past by the European Commission. Nevertheless, their decisions 
must draw on accurate and comprehensive estimates of the costs and benefits of their policy 
options, for not only the Brexit referendum but also future post-Brexit negotiations. Our 
analysis provides detailed simulation results at the sectoral level, unlike earlier studies, 
which focused on aggregate indicators for convenience and the simplicity of presentation to 
voters. Such omissions limit the benefits of analysis using multisector models such as CGE 
models. We demonstrated that the gains and losses would indeed vary among sectors affected 
differently by direct and indirect Brexit shocks. Our results then enable richer policy 
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discussions for reshaping the future European economy under alternative bilateral trade 
deals, like the Norway option, between the UK and the EU27. Although we would strongly 
advise the UK to seek opportunities to remain in the internal market as an affiliate member, 
which nevertheless requires it to make a partial budget contribution, the EU27 may be little 
interested in this in expectation of very limited gains from UK participation. 
 Our study focused on the trade-related factors in static models and did not consider 
any dynamic factors, such as domestic investment and FDI, which drive the European 
economy in the long run. An extension involving dynamic analysis with FDI, à la Hosoe 
(2014) for goods producers and Tarr (2013) for service providers, would enable us to describe 
the deceleration of trade fragmentation in Europe and to quantify the resulting long-run costs 
of Brexit. While our experiments assumed the returning migrants as an exogenous shock, we 
could also examine the impact of Brexit on immigration, as endogenously determined by 
economic environment and policy. We leave these possible extensions to future research. 
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Appendix Tables and Figures Omitted in Main Text 
 The assumed MFN import tariff rates used in TRF for all EU regions are in Table 
A.1. The upper NTB sub-scenario, used in NTB–UK, NTB–EU, FTA–US, and FTA–JP, is in 
Table A.2, while the lower NTB sub-scenario is in Table 3.3. 
 
Table A.1: EU MFN Import Tariff Rates by Origin, Good, and Destination 
[%] 
 
Source: GTAP Database version 9A. 
 
BNL OEU FRA DEU ITA POL ESP SWE GBR
JPN AGR 3.2 2.7 5.3 2.5 4.3 2.8 5.1 1.9 3.2
MIN 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.3
TXA 5.2 6.0 6.0 5.1 6.5 5.3 6.5 5.8 6.7
FOD 9.5 10.8 11.1 8.1 9.8 11.3 9.9 10.0 8.1
WPP 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 2.0 0.2 1.5
CHM 3.6 2.9 3.6 3.3 3.5 2.5 3.1 4.6 3.7
STL 1.7 2.5 2.7 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.7 0.9
AUT 8.3 7.2 7.7 7.1 8.5 6.7 8.1 8.2 6.5
OTE 5.4 3.1 5.0 2.7 4.1 2.6 5.2 2.9 2.1
EEQ 2.0 1.5 2.5 1.8 1.3 2.7 2.5 2.7 2.7
MCH 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8
MAN 1.8 2.6 2.7 1.1 3.4 1.7 3.0 2.9 1.5
USA AGR 2.7 3.2 3.0 2.8 4.4 6.1 3.1 3.1 3.9
TXA 6.2 6.6 7.2 6.7 4.7 5.1 7.0 8.5 8.2
FOD 16.6 12.5 11.2 13.9 16.2 7.0 14.1 11.9 11.2
WPP 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3
CHM 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.6 2.9 1.6 1.5 2.1
STL 1.9 2.2 3.1 1.9 0.9 2.0 2.4 1.7 1.7
AUT 7.3 7.6 5.2 9.1 6.7 7.7 5.8 5.7 4.1
OTE 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.3 0.9
EEQ 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7
MCH 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.6
MAN 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.4 1.0 2.5 1.3 1.9 0.6
ROW AGR 1.8 2.3 2.9 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.6 1.8 2.5
TXA 6.8 6.5 6.8 6.2 5.3 6.1 6.3 6.8 7.1
FOD 15.0 9.5 6.5 11.8 9.5 5.2 6.9 10.7 12.0
WPP 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5
CHM 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.1
STL 0.7 0.8 1.3 0.7 0.5 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.7
AUT 3.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.1 2.9 2.0 2.5
OTE 3.3 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.2 1.5 1.4
EEQ 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.1
MCH 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.2
MAN 0.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.1
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Table A.2: Assumed Change of NTBs in the Upper NTB Sub-scenario [% Point] 
 
Source: Ecorys (2009), Copenhagen Economics (2010), Aussilloux et al. (2011), and author’s 
assumption. 
 
 The details of the welfare impact prediction are in Table A.3 and graphically 
presented in Figure 4.6 with the lower NTB sub-scenario. This table shows that the upper 
NTB sub-scenario would lead to a larger welfare loss for the UK and a larger gain for the 
EU27. 
 
Table A.3: Details of Welfare Impact in EVs 
 
 
From: EU EU EU EU EU EU EU EU EU27/GBR EU27 EU27 JPN USA
To: BNL OEU FRA DEU ITA POL ESP SWE GBR/EU27 JPN USA EU27 EU27
AGR −13.8 −15.5 −15.1 −16.8 −17.0 −16.8 −16.2 −16.0
TXA −20.0 −22.9 −22.3 −22.0 −22.5 −23.0 −23.1 −22.4 2.4 −9.0 −6.5
FOD −24.2 −31.8 −31.9 −31.9 −32.5 −31.9 −32.4 −31.2 7.5 −9.0 −37.4 −20.8
WPP −0.9 −2.8 −1.5 −4.2 −2.7 −2.8 −4.2 −4.7 1.7 −10.6 −4.7 −4.7
CHM −16.1 −22.2 −20.2 −21.7 −21.4 −22.8 −22.1 −21.0 3.8 −20.0 −12.0 −7.3 −9.2
STL −0.9 −2.1 −0.9 −2.5 −2.3 −2.8 −2.3 −3.1 1.9 −6.5 −8.5 −1.9 −2.7
AUT −0.7 −1.3 −1.1 −1.9 −1.6 −1.0 −1.1 −1.7 3.0 −3.8 −11.3 −3.5 −8.2
OTE −1.7 −6.7 −1.1 −1.8 −2.7 −1.3 −3.3 −4.5 2.8 −41.0 −9.7 −3.1 −6.2
EEQ −2.0 −2.7 −2.8 −4.4 −4.6 −2.3 −5.2 −6.9 0.7 −3.9 −2.5 −1.7 −1.7
MCH −2.1 −3.0 −2.4 −4.8 −3.7 −2.6 −4.0 −5.2 −3.9
MAN −20.1 −27.8 −29.1 −27.7 −28.5 −27.5 −28.3 −25.3
ATR −6.8 −6.7 −7.1 −8.8 −7.8 −6.8 −5.8 −8.2 −1.3 −0.4
WTR −18.6 −17.6 −19.4 −19.4 −20.9 −19.0 −17.2 −20.3 −5.2 −1.4
OTR −6.8 −6.7 −7.1 −8.8 −7.8 −6.8 −5.8 −8.2
ICT −10.3 −10.0 −9.6 −12.5 −12.0 −10.7 −10.9 −11.8 1.3 −3.7 −1.7 −2.5 −2.9
FIN −12.8 −12.3 −10.2 −12.7 −12.4 −12.2 −12.2 −12.8 1.4 −8.7 −17.4 −2.9 −2.3
INS −21.2 −21.1 −19.3 −21.4 −21.9 −21.1 −21.3 −21.4 1.4 −1.2 −9.2 −2.8 −2.8
CMM −10.4 −10.4 −9.4 −11.5 −11.8 −10.5 −10.7 −12.4 2.0 −19.2 −1.1 −4.3 −4.3
CON −12.5 −12.3 −10.2 −17.6 −13.7 −13.8 −13.0 −15.5 0.4 −1.9 −1.4 −1.9 −1.3
PCS −12.5 −12.4 −11.9 −14.3 −13.6 −12.5 −11.8 −13.7 0.4 −3.7 −1.2 −1.0 −0.6
SRV −12.5 −12.4 −11.9 −14.3 −13.6 −12.5 −11.8 −13.7
UK EU27
Lower NTB Upper NTB Lower NTB Upper NTB
[mil. USD] [% of GDP] [mil. USD] [% of GDP] [mil. USD] [% of GDP] [mil. USD] [% of GDP]
IRS Model Estimate
ALL −24,055 (−1.06) −34,302 (−1.51) 406,891 ( 2.89) 691,307 ( 4.91)
BUD 7,221 ( 0.32) ← ← −7,094 (−0.05) ← ←
TRF −2,209 (−0.10) ← ← −2,127 (−0.02) ← ←
NTB-UK −11,277 (−0.49) −17,563 (−0.77) −6,061 (−0.04) −9,785 (−0.07)
MIG −10,089 (−0.44) ← ← 13,056 ( 0.09) ← ←
NTB-EU −7,047 (−0.31) −11,404 (−0.50) 380,311 ( 2.70) 650,852 ( 4.62)
FTA-JP −415 (−0.02) −547 (−0.02) 3,868 ( 0.03) 6,463 ( 0.05)
FTA-US −1,545 (−0.07) −2,342 (−0.10) 25,140 ( 0.18) 40,587 ( 0.29)
Interaction 1,306 ( 0.06) 2,631 ( 0.12) −202 (−0.00) −645 (−0.00)
CRS Model Estimate
ALL −14,706 (−0.65) −23,465 (−1.03) 433,325 ( 3.08) 731,405 ( 5.19)
BUD 8,441 ( 0.37) ← ← −8,692 (−0.06) ← ←
TRF 615 ( 0.03) ← ← −3,329 (−0.02) ← ←
NTB-UK −10,599 (−0.47) −16,557 (−0.73) −7,848 (−0.06) −12,505 (−0.09)
MIG −8,048 (−0.35) ← ← 10,255 ( 0.07) ← ←
NTB-EU −4,690 (−0.21) −7,628 (−0.33) 402,409 ( 2.86) 681,575 ( 4.84)
FTA-JP −189 (−0.01) −250 (−0.01) 6,558 ( 0.05) 9,372 ( 0.07)
FTA-US −943 (−0.04) −1,471 (−0.06) 34,080 ( 0.24) 55,475 ( 0.39)
Interaction 707 ( 0.03) 1,433 ( 0.06) −108 (−0.00) −746 (−0.01)
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 Larger NTB changes would impact exports and the number of firms more 
significantly in most sectors, while the impacts on sectors with more marginal changes may 
flip (e.g., WPP and MCH of the UK in Figure A.1; and MCH in the UK and AUT and MAN 
in the EU27 in Figure A.2). Similar observations are made by comparing Figure 4.3 (the 
lower NTB sub-scenario) with Figure A.5 (the upper NTB sub-scenario), where the IRS model 
is used consistently. The CRS model prediction in Figure A.3 is smaller than the IRS model 
prediction in Figure 4.3. It is notable that CHM, which benefited most from Brexit in the 
EU27 by the IRS model prediction, would have a smaller gain than FOD in the CRS model 
prediction. This indicates that firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the prediction of the 
trade impact, especially on CHM. 
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Figure A.1: Total Impact of Brexit (ALL) on UK–EU27 Bilateral Exports with the Upper NTB 
Sub-scenario 
[% Change from Base] 
 
[Export Value Change, % of UK GDP] 
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Figure A.2: Impact of Brexit (ALL) on Number of Firms by Supply Destination in the UK 
(top) and EU27 (bottom) with the Upper NTB Sub-scenario 
[% Change from Base] 
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Figure A.3: Impact of Brexit (ALL) on Exports by the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom) by 
Direction Predicted by a CRS Model with the Lower NTB Sub-scenario 
[Export Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
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Figure A.4: Impact of Brexit (ALL) on Exports by the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom) by 
Direction Predicted by a CRS Model with the Upper NTB Sub-scenario 
[Export Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
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Figure A.5: Impact of Brexit (ALL) on Exports by the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom) by 
Direction Predicted by an IRS Model with the Upper NTB Sub-scenario 
[Export Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
  
  
 
 The larger changes in the upper NTB sub-scenario would intensify the export 
volume change in the four NTB-related scenarios (Figure A.6). Among these, NTB–EU is not 
as significant a factor for the UK but is for the EU27. Therefore, the choice of sub-scenario 
more markedly affects EU27 exports than UK exports. 
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Figure A.6: Aggregate Export Changes by Scenario Factor with the Upper NTB Sub-scenario 
[Export Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
 
 
Table A.4: Aggregate Export Changes by Scenario Factor with Alternative NTB Sub-
scenarios and Models 
[Export Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
 
Notes: Results graphically presented in Figures 4.4 and A.6. 
 
 For the UK, the CRS model would predict smaller sectoral value-added changes, 
particularly in the seven sectors assumed to be IRS sectors in the IRS model (Figure A.7). On 
-10
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BUD
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NTB-UK
MIG
NTB-EU
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FTA-US
Interaction
UK EU27
Lower NTB Upper NTB Lower NTB Upper NTB
IRS CRS IRS CRS IRS CRS IRS CRS
ALL −5.05 −4.70 −5.83 −5.61 9.30 6.94 15.42 11.28
BUD −0.65 −0.59 ← ← 0.10 0.09 ← ←
TRF −2.43 −2.09 ← ← −0.22 −0.17 ← ←
NTB-UK −1.62 −1.41 −2.53 −2.19 −0.15 −0.12 −0.24 −0.18
MIG −0.40 −0.35 ← ← 0.08 0.07 ← ←
NTB-EU −0.27 −0.42 −0.36 −0.67 8.46 6.32 14.28 10.44
FTA-JP −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.18
FTA-US −0.09 −0.09 −0.15 −0.15 0.84 0.61 1.26 0.89
Interaction 0.42 0.28 0.70 0.47 −0.02 −0.00 −0.08 −0.03
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the EU27 side, the sensitivity of the value-added impacts to model choice is not so 
straightforward. For example, in the CRS setup, the gains from NTB–EU would be more 
intense for CHM, while gains or losses would become smaller in most sectors. Gainers and 
losers are consistently the same for predictions by the two models and larger NTB changes 
would generally intensify the sectoral value-added changes (Figure A.9). 
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Figure A.7: Value-Added Change in the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom), Predicted by a CRS 
Model with the Lower NTB Sub-scenario 
[Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
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Figure A.8: Value-Added Change in the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom), Predicted by a CRS 
Model with the Upper NTB Sub-scenario 
[Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
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Figure A.9: Value-Added Change in the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom), Predicted by an IRS 
Model with the Upper NTB Sub-scenario 
[Value Change, % of UK and EU27 GDP] 
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